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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to address the nature 
of Japanese-American bilateral relations in the twentieth 
century. An adaptation of George Modelski's theory of 
global long cycles is the tool used to analyze the 
relationship. This adaptation gives a broader evaluation 
of the relationship and provides a basis for predicting 
possible economic shifts. The focus of the analysis is an 
exploration of whether changes occurring in the post-1980s 
lay the ground work for a new stage of friction similar to 
that of the interwar period. Specifically, the argument 
is that the United States is in a period of decline and 
that Japan is vying for the role of Pacific leader in the 
twenty-first century. An examination is made of the 
relative decline of American power in the Pacific and the 
challenge posed by other actors, specifically Japan, to 
the United States' governments role as the Pacific's 
leader and its main power. The nature of a possible 
struggle is taking shape. Therefore, it is imperative 
that one examine the current period of instability and the
iii
last period of instability to determine the possible roots 
of the next cycle's conflict. Whether Japan emerges as 
the next Pacific leader or the cyclical pattern of world 
leadership holds true at the bilateral level, for the 
coming century, a period of change, instability and 
challenge is underway in Japanese-American relations.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the nature 
of a possible reemergence of change, friction, and 
instability in United States-Japan bilateral relations.
An examination of the United States-Japan relationship in 
the twentieth century with respect to the Pacific is made 
according to an adaptation of George Modelski's theory of 
long cycles in global politics. By adapting Modelski's 
theory of global long cycles to explore bilateral 
relations, one is able to broadly evaluate bilateral 
relationships by accounting for economic shifts and their 
effect. It is also one possible approach to explaining 
the relationship. The rationale for comparing the 
interwar period to the post-1980s is this: if one can 
understand the causes of the last United States-Japan 
conflict, one can determine the possible basis for the 
next such conflict.
According to Modelski, every century experiences a 
cycle of four distinct stages: conflict, hegemonic 
leadership, delegitimation, and deconcentration. Because
v
the bilateral relationship of the United States' 
government with the Japanese government has parallels to 
the theory of global long cycles, one can use an 
adaptation of the theory to determine if it will explain 
the relationship and its changing nature. Explanations of 
these stages are in terms of the United States' 
government's role. The instability which characterized 
the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s epitomizes the 
last fourth stage. In this stage, the United States and 
Japan are Pacific powers, struggling to clarify their 
leadership roles. In the second stage, the United States' 
government's role as the unquestioned leader of the 
Pacific typifies hegemonic leadership and stability 
(1946-1968). The emerging instability of the late 1960s 
to early 1980s is an illustration of the third stage, 
delegitimation. The Vietnam War, the collapse of Cambodia 
and Laos, and the emergence of Japan as an economic rival 
in the Pacific, as well as the growing inability of the 
United States1 government to deal with the needs of the 
region denote this instability. The economic and 
political collapse of the status quo and the decline of 
the United States as the Pacific's leader (1980s to the 
present) characterize the fourth stage, deconcentration. 
Specifically, this stage addresses the changing nature of
vi
the power system from that of military power to economic 
power within the Pacific.
Given these time frames, stage four of the first long 
cycle in United States-Japan relations deals with the 
emergence of the United States as a new Pacific power and 
Japan as cocontender for recognition as the Pacific's 
leader. The first stage of the current cycle is that of 
conflict, World War II.,. Stages two and three concern the 
periods when: (1) the United States is the unquestioned
regional leader and Japan its compliant ally, (2) states 
in the region begin to rebel against the status quo, and 
(3) Japan emerges as a trade giant. Finally, stage four 
covers the collapse of the status quo and the open 
challenge posed by Japan to the United States' leadership 
in Pacific trade and finance. Because change, friction, 
and instability mark when cycles emerge and conclude, the 
emphasis of this thesis is on the fourth stage of the 
first and second long cycles in United States-Japan 
relations. However, stages two and three are briefly 
covered. Additionally, an exploration is made of the 
various scenarios for the end of the current long cycle.
Before elaborating upon Modelski's stages, it is best 
to clarify terms used throughout this thesis. "Power" is 
defined as possession of control, authority, or influence
vii
over others; one having such power, specifically a 
sovereign state; implied possession or ability to wield 
force, permissive authority, or substantial influence.
The definition of "supremacy" is that of absolute 
authority or power. National security interests are 
defined as the economic, market, or trade issues which 
affect national economic welfare of a sovereign state. 
Additionally, the unit of analysis by which actions are 
measured is that of a sovereign state responding to 
economic and market realities.
With respect to stage four of the first long cycle in 
United States-Japan relations, the premise is that 
economic and military needs precipitated the Washington 
Naval Conference (1922) and laid the groundwork for 
increased conflict between the United States' and Japanese 
governments. A review of the issues leading to the 
conference and its aftermath covers the effect economic 
and market forces had on foreign policy choices. Areas of 
emphasis are; (1) the degree to which national security 
considerations influenced American and Japanese positions 
at the Washington Naval Conference, and (2) the degree to 
which the Washington conference realized national 
interests.
As an integral part of this stage, the events which 
led to the London Naval Conference (1930), its goals, its 
problems, and its effect on Japan are addressed. Finally, 
the past fourth stage is compared to the current period of 
Japanese and American relations. This comparison is with 
respect to trade interests in the Pacific and each 
nation's pursuit of domestic economic survival to see if 
it supports the premise that a new fourth cycle is 
underway. The next possible option is that Japan could 
emerge as the new Pacific leader. A second option is that 
the United States could regain its ascendancy in the 
Pacific, much as Great Britain did at the global level in 
the nineteenth century. The third option is that a new 
world system could emerge which marks the end of the last 
500 years of long cycles and which requires a new model.
ix
1CHAPTER 1
This chapter explains the premises and the theory 
used to examine "the Japanese-American bilateral 
relationship. Additionally, one finds a brief review of 
the relevant literature with explanations of its 
contributions and limitations. Finally, an examination of 
George Modelski's theory of long cycles is made and an 
adaptation used to explore the changing nature of 
Japanese-American power relations. This adaptation 
amplifies the economic reasons for change in the 
relationship.
The basic premise of this thesis is : (1) there are 
dynamic changes in the Japanese-American relationship, (2) 
these changes concern the role of trade in determining the 
future course of the relationship, (3) these changes are 
cyclical in nature, (4) the Japanese-American relationship 
is in the final stage of deconcentration, and (5) an
i '
examination of the interwar period enables one to form 
certain assumptions concerning the nature of the 
Japanese-American governmental relationship prior to the 
last hegemonic conflict. Given these assumptions, it is
2possible that the nature of Japanese-American governmental 
relations and each nation's role in the Pacific is 
changing. Furthermore; it possible that Japan may assume 
primacy in the Pacific, especially with respect to trade, 
and that the next long cycle's conflict stage may evolve 
around the issue of which nation controls Pacific trade.
To address the nature of the Japanese-American 
relationship, especially its economic nature, several of 
the leading theories in the field were considered.
Although Hans Morgenthau's In Defense of the National 
Interest and Politics Among Nations. Robert Gilpin's 
Global Politics, and Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of 
the Great Powers contributed various ways to analyze the 
relations among states, the theory of long cycles 
propounded by George Modelski in Exploring Long Cycles and 
Long Cycles in Global Politics allowed for a more thorough s 
explanation of economic factors and the role of economics 
in bilateral relations. Beginning with Morgenthau, one 
finds an examination of these works to explain why the 
theory of long cycles best suited this thesis.
According to Morgenthau's vision of power politics 
and the balance of power, the United States' government 
improvises its policies as it goes along instead of 
determining what are its true foreign policy interests.
It "[invokes] some abstract moral principle" instead of
3marshalling "public opinion in support of war and warlike
policies," thus leading to its own failures in foreign
policy. When it comes to American relations with the
Pacific in the twentieth century, Morgenthau states they
are: (1) neither "obvious nor clearly defined," (2) fail
to express the national interest, and (3) overly 
2moralistic. American foreign policy in the Pacific is
seen as still oriented toward the concept of the Open Door
with China. It is basically a balance of power
relationship whereby China balances American security
3interests against the former Soviet Union. Very simply, 
the United States relies on power politics, an inherently 
practical and simple way to achieve its goals, but couches 
its demands in a political and moralistic language.4 
Morgenthau argues that "self-preservati'on is the first 
duty of a nation;" therefore, the United States must act 
in its best interests without regard to moral principles.
While these principles are correct insofar as they 
address the bipolar world of the Cold War, they do not 
allow room for changes to or the dissolution of the status 
quo. The Cold War Soviet-American governmental 
relationship shaped Morgenthau1s argument. He did not 
foresee the rise of the Japanese nation as a possible 
contender for Pacific leadership. Everything is tied to 
balancing Soviet moves, especially in Europe. Even the
4role of China, with nary a glance to Japan, is tied to how 
it can balance the Soviet government so that American 
security needs can be met. Morgenthau did not consider 
the possibility that the Japanese government could act 
independently of the United States or that it could 
eventually no longer need American protection. Morgenthau 
did not foresee the impact vast wealth, extensive 
industrialization, and burgeoning trade have on current 
state relations. There is also no accounting for the 
possibility that the Cold War equation could change or 
that economic conditions, especially with respect to 
trade, could cause a change in the existing order or 
contribute to instability in the Pacific.
Turning to Robert Gilpin's and Paul Kennedy's 
arguments, they are relevant and interesting. According 
to Gilpin's rational choice (economic) theory, individual s 
actors are rational and try to achieve maximum 
satisfaction of their respective values and interests at 
minimum cost to themselves. The rationality of the actor 
is tied solely to the attempt to reach a goal, not to 
whether the'goal is achieved. Thus, an actor will pursue 
an issue until costs and benefits are equalized. Drawing 
upon this explanation of what amounts to a marginal 
utility (Pareto) curve, Gilpin extrapolates this to form a 
general theory of social and political change. This
5general theory is then applied to international political 
change and focuses on how technical and economic changes 
effect power and individual interests.
Bearing this in mind, a state attempts to change the
political system to increase its relative power and to
decrease the cost of its political arrangements until
equilibrium is reached. Once it achieves equilibrium, the
state will then try to change the existing political 
5
system. For a state to destabilize the bipolar system 
and lead to hegemonic conflict it must see: (1) the
failure of one power to play its balancing role, (2) a 
third power arise and upset the bipolar balance of power, 
(3) the international political system break into two 
hostile camps, (4) the major powers become entangled in 
the ambitions and problems of (a) minor' power(s), and (5) 
a loss of control over economic, political, and social 
developments.
Although Gilpin makes a cogent argument for economic 
determinism, there are some shortcomings to his theory.
To begin with, actors do not always behave rationally or 
achieve equilibrium. Actors may accept trade-offs on 
maximizing their utility to achieve non-economic goals 
such as prestige, much as Japan did at the Washington and 
London Naval Conferences in the interwar period. There is 
also the inherent assumption, given the context of
6Soviet-American relations in existence at the time Gilpin 
wrote Global Politics, that although one party may weaken, 
it will not collapse. Gilpin makes no allowance for the 
total dissolution of a state. While a third party could 
emerge, Japan did not upset the bipolar balance of power 
as Gilpin's theory states a third party would— Japan was a 
staunch ally of "the United States against the Soviet 
Union. The international political system has not 
remained in two hostile ideological camps, communism is 
dead and multipolarity is more the rule. Finally, the 
degree and kind of loss of control over economic, 
political, and social developments is not really defined.
As for Kennedy, the historical perspective of The 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers provided a wealth of 
historical data and closely paralleled long cycle theory 
on many points. However, his broad-brush approach of 
addressing the rise of the West as the broker of power 
internationally focuses almost exclusively on coalition 
warfare. Although it addresses the interaction of 
economics and military strength, it is mainly from a 
Western perspective. His main point, that
the relative strengths of the leading nations in world 
affairs never remain constant, . . . because of the 
uneven rate of growth among different societies and of 
the technological and organizational breakthroughs 
which bring a greater advantage to one society than tg 
another,
7is valid but Kennedy only used it to address Western 
powers. Kennedy himself acknowledges this limitation by 
stating:
the history of the rise and later fall of the leading 
countries in the Great Power system since the advance 
of western Europe in the sixteenth century —  that is, 
of nations such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, the 
British Empire, and currently the United States —  
shows a very significant correlation over the longer 
term between production and revenue-raising capacities 
on the one hand and military strength on the other. ^
With this acknowledgment of his look at Western *“ 
history in the modern era, he also admits he was "tempted 
from the historian's profession into the uncertain world 
of speculation upon the future, just as the nineteenth 
century historian Leopold von Ranke did in an essay on the
Q
great powers of his era." While Kennedy used his data 
effectively to present an historical account of modern 
world (i.e., Western) history, there was no scientific 
definition of what constitutes a state, what factors will 
influence a state's relationship to another state, how a 
state will act, and what kinds of policy decisions the 
state will make. The approach was also too far ranging to 
address Japanese-American trade relations in sufficient 
detail for this thesis. Kennedy's examination of the rise 
and fall of great powers is an historical perspective of 
the evolution and decline of powers. It does not use
8scientific reasoning to test an hypothesis as a political
scientist does.
While none of these works focused on economics to the
extent necessary for an examination of twentieth century
J-apanese-American bilateral relations, they enabled me to
choose the best tool for the job. Although the argument
presented here concerns bilateral relations, an adaptation
of long cycles theory is an intriguing way to explain the
relationship.
According to Modelski, long cycles explain the
rationale for world war and the nature of orderly 
9succession. This thesis explores possible Japanese
governmental succession of the United States as the
Pacific's leader and its assumption of primacy in the
bilateral relationship. According to Modelski, a long
cycle is the "rhythm of global politics" and the social
system.10 These cycles are dynamic occurrences which are
11part of modern society. To qualify as such, a long 
cycle must go through four stages: global war, world
power (leadership/stability), delegitimation (decline), 
and deconcentration (challenge/conflict).
During global war, the entire order is in chaos as the 
various powers use military and/or trade warfare to 
determine the global leader. In the victor's period as 
world power, there is a period of hegemonic stability
9supplied and defined by the world leader for the entire
world. During delegitimation, one hears the initial
rumblings of instability as the states question and
challenge the validity of the world power's leadership.
During deconcentration, the world leader cannot meet the
stability needs of the system it created. Other major
powers challenge’ it for the role of world leader. This is
the final stage before the entire system plunges into
chaos in a new global war in the first stage of the next
long cycle. The cycle can also exhibit one or a
combination of three types of global politics: polarity,
12coalition, or macroconflict.
During a long cycle, polarity occurs when the long
cycle moves from low— to high— to low— power
concentrations which correspond to sea power on the world
level. Coalition occurs when a core alliance has a large
group of affiliated states which follow its lead. The
characteristics of this coalition are stability and
continuity for the system (provided by the core alliance)
until the next global war. Conflict occurs during
deconcentration of the core alliance. Through long cycle
analysis, one can foresee approximately when a conflict
may occur and how it may impact the political and economic
13power of the major powers.
10
During the modern period, five distinct global cycles
occurred: Portugese, Dutch, British I, British II, and
American. As one may argue, the current bilateral cycle
may end and a third long cycle may occur in the next
century. Within this modified framework, it is possible
that the current period of bilateral instability reflects
a possible challenge posed by Japan to the United States.
The Pacific leader realizes that while it still possesses
significant resources, problems occur because of the need
14to address changing economic dynamics. In other words,
the Pacific economy (which is based on trade and
multinational corporations) has functional difficulties
under American leadership. Restrictive regulations and a
paucity of capital available for local and Pacific
investment account for part of the problem. The other
problem is that of security and stability.
While an understanding of economics is critical to the
concept of long cycles, comprehension of the affect the
distribution of naval power has on states is just as
important. According to Modelski, naval power is the key
indicator of global reach and power status because sea
power serves as the "stabilizer of the modern status 
15quo." The world power is the leader of the global 
political system because it has the military superiority 
and the capacity for global reach necessary to secure
11
trade and shipping lanes. The critical factor permitting 
global reach and the ability to support a navy is the 
nation's wealth.
Because trade is the means by which wealth is brought 
into a country through the exchange of goods and services, 
it is also the component which requires naval protection. 
To ensure safe and free passage of goods, and of the 
merchant vessels carrying them, a state must possess some 
way to protect its trade. Logically, a state must have a 
navy with sufficient size and force to meet the safety 
needs of its mercantile interests, thus ensuring trade 
continues and expands. At the same time, a poor state 
cannot afford to protect its trade interests via a navy; 
therefore, a rich state with dynamic foreign trade is the 
state which provides the protection of a navy. The world 
leader is the sea power which emerges at the end of a 
global war (economic or military), with sea power as the 
key measure of its "capacity to lead, organize and support 
the global system."16
If the theory of long cycles holds true at the 
bilateral lfevel, the next challenger and rival in a 
possible hegemonic war with the United States will be a 
maritime trading power. Japan is one state which meets 
this requirement. Japan has the largest maritime fleet in 
the Pacific as well as the third largest outlay on
12
military expenditures in the world. Following this 
approach, Japan is a possible contender for the role of 
Pacific leadership.
When viewed within the context of the long cycle of 
naval and economic power, the current bilateral 
Japanese-American relationship follows a pattern similar 
to the long cycles shown in the following table:
CONFLICT 
1494-1516 
ITALIAN- 
INDIAN 
OCEAN WARS
WORLD POWER
1516-1539
PORTUGAL
DELEGITIMATION DECONCENTRATION
1580-1609 1609-1639
SPANISH- HOLLAND 
DUTCH WAR
1688-1713 
LOUIS XIV 
WARS
1714-1739 
BRITAIN I
1792-1815 1815-1849
FRENCH BRITAIN II
REVOLUTION-
NAPOLEONIC
WARS
1917-1945 1945-1968
WORLD WAR UNITED 
I/II STATES
1540-1560
PORTUGESE
CYCLE
1640-1660 
DUTCH CYCLE
1740-1763 
FIRST BRITISH 
CYCLE
1560-1580
SPAIN
1660-1688
FRANCE
1764-1792
FRANCE
1850-1873 1874-1914
SECOND BRITISH GERMANY 
CYCLE
1968-1982
AMERICAN
CYCLE
1983-2013 (?) 
JAPAN
17
Viewed within this theoretical context, the conclusion of 
World War II catapulted the United States to the position 
of Pacific leader. The height of the American era was 
1947-68. The beginnings of decline and delegitimation
13
occurred in 1968 with the escalation of the Vietnam War, 
the change in the United Nations to a Third World forum, 
the 197 3 Arab oil embargo, and the communist challenge (up 
through the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989) . The 
current period, that of the onset of deconcentration and 
conflict, is marked by trade and political tensions the 
United States and other states and the European Community 
at the global level.
Translated to the bilateral context of United 
States-Japan relations, the first and second cycle look 
something like this:
CONFLICT 
1846-1873 
MANIFEST 
DESTINY/ 
TRADE WAR
1931-1945 
WORLD 
WAR I
HEGEMONY 
1873-1890 
UNITED 
STATES I
1945-1968 
UNITED 
STATES II
DELEGITIMATION 
1890-1914 
FIRST AMERICAN 
CYCLE
1968-1982
SECOND
AMERICAN CYCLE
DECONCENTRATION
1914-1931
JAPAN
1982-2013 (?) 
JAPAN
In the first long cycle, American efforts to 
dominate Pacific trade with Japan (to the exclusion of 
British merchants) prompted a fierce struggle in the 
Japanese government over American access and influence in 
Japan. American naval, trade, and security interests 
under Manifest Destiny prompted continued efforts to 
breach Japanese isolationism. In stage two, the American 
navy and businesses had free reign in Japan. In stage
14
three, the Japanese government and industry reasserted 
themselves via a program of rapid modernization and 
territorial expansion. In stage four, the Japanese 
military, business community, and government openly 
challenged the American navy and business interests in the 
Pacific.
During the current cycle, World War II marked stage 
one. Stages two and three parallel the global stages of 
Modelski's American cycle. Finally, trade and political 
tensions between the United States' and Japanese 
governments characterize stage four of the current 
bilateral relationship.
While conflict is generally in the form of global
military warfare, the breakdown of the global system can
18take the form of trade warfare or trade’ friction. While 
the military element is important in the overall equation 
of leadership, it is primarily the economic strength of 
the state which enables it to have the protection of a 
strong navy. Therefore, if a state is in decline due to 
diminishment of its market share and weakening of its 
economic health, it will fight to protect its resources. 
Specifically, it will engage in trade warfare to preserve 
its markets domestically and abroad. It will use 
restrictive taxes, import barriers, and unfair trade 
practices (dumping, selling below cost, etc.).
15
Prior to this phase, the emerging power (Japan) 
clarifies and consolidates its position during the stages 
of delegitimation and deconcentration through exploitation 
of the very means which brought the old power (the United 
States) to its position of leadership. During this period 
of consolidation, the emerging state relies on the 
protective mantle of the reigning power's navy to protect 
its own interests without going to the expense of building 
a large, strong navy. It relies on that state's ability 
to keep trade lanes and ports open to take advantage of 
markets.
Applied to the Pacific, the Japanese government took 
advantage of American naval hegemony to further its trade 
interests much as the United States' government did with 
respect to Great Britain's navy through- the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. In this period, the American 
navy was fairly weak while the British navy was the 
largest and strongest in the world as well as in the 
Pacific. By depending upon the British navy to police 
Pacific waters, American businesses traded in areas the 
British navy controlled. The Open Door policy of equal 
access to the China trade typified this symbiotic 
relationship between American businesses and British naval 
power in the Pacific.
16
In this transitional stage, of deconcentration, the
international order becomes volatile, social unrest
occurs, the GNP falls, unemployment and inflation
escalate, and new economic and politico-military powers
19arise to form a multi-polar system. Because hegemonic
stability lasts only as long as power rests in the hands
of one state, the international system and economic order
remain legitimate and stable only as long as that state
maintains its economic and military capacity and will to
act. Once the state loses its capacity, whether through
technology transfer, over-commitment to policies and
principles, or lack of dynamic action, power
deconcentrates, free markets collapse, and closed economic 
20zones emerge.
In the United States-Japan context', one can see this 
occurring by examining the scaling down of the American \
military, the Japanese technology advantage, the inability 
of the United States' government to act unilaterally to 
enforce its will, the Japanese government's expanding 
diplomatic overtures in the Pacific, and the relative 
closing of Pacific markets to American goods. For 
example, the drawdown of American military personnel to a 
smaller force in both the active and reserve sectors 
points to a fundamental inability to support the continued 
economic drain of a large military on the national
17
treasury. The technological edge of Japan in fields such 
as robotics, bio-technology, semi-conductors, and 
electro-optics enables them to make inroads into existing 
markets such as consumer electronics (televisions, 
computers, games) and create new ones without much 
competition.
Additionally, the fact that the United States' 
government had to ask for money from coalition countries 
in order to wage war against Iraq further underscores its 
weakening control and inability to act unilaterally. 
Finally, the Japanese government's increasing role in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
Cambodian peace accords, as well as the ability of 
Japanese businesses to penetrate and dominate Pacific 
markets, further accents the current de'concentration of 
American military, political, and economic power. This 
fourth stage of increased instability and deconcentration 
is laying the foundation for the first stage of the next 
long cycle.
While the modern world system is composed of global 
political, global economic, and cultural subsystems, the 
global political system is the most important and is
21closely intertwined with the global economic system.
This is true because the world leader shapes the global 
political system through economic means. This is possible
18
only if it can afford to provide for the public good at 
its own expense and in accordance with its guiding 
ideology or principles. On the bilateral level, with the 
United States' government in serious financial 
difficulties, it is no longer able to provide the 
stability necessary to Japan's (or the Pacific's) security 
and economic needs. It can neither fund a large navy nor 
grant large loans to the Japanese government and industry 
(or to developing nations). This ability to underwrite 
the region is crucial to maintaining hegemony because the 
leading state requires international (regional) stability 
in order for its political and economic needs to be met.
According to Modelski, if a state cannot buy 
stability through the use of its navy or the promise of 
financial aid to other states, the international peace 
begins to crumble. States dissolve alliances and shipping 
becomes endangered. If this is the case, the United 
States' government must rely upon the Japanese government 
to step forward and lend support to shape the Pacific's 
political system. This is typical during stage four of 
long cycle analysis. It again points to the possible 
nature of the next cycle's initial conflict— a struggle 
for control and leadership.
Viewed from the context of long cycles, each cycle 
occurs every 100 to 120 years after some form of global
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conflict. Based on the regional context of the United 
States-Japan relationship, this conflict could take the 
form of trade warfare. Each phase of the cycle— conflict, 
leadership, decline, and challenge— lasts 25 to 30 years
and the United States1 government appears to be in the
22fourth stage of this cycle. When the current or old 
leader no longer has a strong economy, its leadership is 
weakened and delegitimized. This appears to be what is 
happening now to the United States1 position in the 
Pacific. A specific example of this weakness is the 
recent trade talks failure. Despite President George Bush, 
and the chairmen of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler 
going to Japan to try and coerce the Japanese government 
and business leaders into granting concessions, nothing 
concrete happened. The only thing that became clear from 
the visit was that the United States' President, arguably 
the most powerful man in the world, could not get his 
demands met by an erstwhile ally— his power and prestige 
were insufficient.
Based on long cycle theory, if Japan succeeds the 
United Statfes as the Pacific leader in the next long 
cycle, it must have similar characteristics. If regional 
powers have the same characteristics as world powers, they 
must have: (1) stable domestic politics and be open to
the world, (2) a strong, dynamic economy, (3) some form of
20
politico-strategic organization capable of exerting global 
power (a strong navy), and (4) the characteristics of an 
island or a peninsular state.
While air power is an important part of modern 
military force projection, naval power is still the most 
flexible as it is self-supporting. Naval power also has 
the added benefit of having submarines and aircraft 
carriers, assets capable of operating autonomously. Air 
power by itself is not as responsive as naval power. It 
requires a massive support base and long supply lines if 
it is to operate in forward deployed areas. Nuclear 
forces are not viable in this equation either, as they are 
impractical to use, warheads would have to be 
reprogrammed, and assets would have to be within striking 
distance of the target area. Nuclear weapons have the 
drawback of irradiating and rendering useless the area one  ^
wants to control and economically exploit. Additionally, 
the new power is an ally of the existing leader, despite 
challenging that leadership.
If one transfers world leadership characteristics to 
bilateral leadership ones, the Japanese government becomes 
a logical contender for leadership. Japan has a 
homogeneous, stable governmental system and is 
increasingly participatory in Pacific economic and 
political forums such as the Association of Southeast
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Asian Nations (ASEAN). There is no doubt as to its
economic viability or dynamism and, through the Ministry
for International Trade and Industry(MITI), the Japanese
government exerts its financial power throughout the
Pacific. Japan is also a seafaring island nation and the
United States' government's closest ally in the Pacific.
With these power characteristics applied to Japan, it
is not difficult to cast it as the United States'
potential successor. Conversely, opposing or rival powers
are generally continental states, have significant
political and social divisions, a large economic capacity
(though not as large as the existing world power), an
inconsistent politico-strategic organization, and lack the
2 3knowledge and ability to manage a world system. These
characteristics are applicable to the former Soviet Union
(the new Commonwealth of Independent States) in its quest
for the role of global and European leader.
Returning to Modelski, yet another factor in long
cycles is the direction in which power moves. Power
shifts to an area where global actors and organizations
concentrate’to form an environment favorable to high
24levels of investment and innovation. In the case of 
modern history, leadership and power shift from one naval 
and trading power to the next. This pattern of following 
capital and technology from one state to the next points
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all the more directly to the Pacific and Japan. The 
region is both economically and technologically dynamic, 
especially Japan. The economic and technological base of 
the United States appears to be lagging behind that of 
Japan.
While one can use the analytical framework of long 
cycles to explain Japanese-American bilateral 
relationship, there are some limits to this theory. 
According to Modelski, ,the four phases fall within a 100 
to 120 year long cycle and last 25 to 30 years. However, 
it seems these phases occur closer together and are more 
concentrated. Despite this drawing together or 
compression of time allotted to phases, Modelski tries to 
account for it by allowing phases to overlap with no clear 
break. Allowing cycles to overlap makes it difficult to 
logically trace periodic developments within cycles. 
Another problem is the shifting of patterns of stability 
and instability seem to occur much more rapidly. While 
this may in fact be happening, the phases of long cycles 
are still applicable to the Japanese-American equation as 
the root causes for stability or instability are still 
valid. Bearing these limitations in mind, long cycle 
analysis is the most comprehensive strategy for evaluating 
twentieth century Japanese-American relations.
23
Given the nature of long cycles and of the transition
from delegitimation to deconcentration, it is possible the
United States' government may experience another period of
bilateral leadership much as Great Britain did at the
global level in the nineteenth century. If the United
States' government is to enter a second phase of hegemonic
leadership in the Pacific it must meet two challenges.
These challenges are: (1) Can the United States preserve
the balance between its defined requirements and the means
available to meet these self-defined goals? and (2) Can
the United States preserve its technological and economic
2 5power bases as regional production patterns shift?
By reviewing the relevant literature and selecting 
the theory of long cycles, one established the premise 
that the current American cycle is in its fourth stage.
One reviewed the four phases of a long cycle, the 
preceding four long cycles in global history, and the last 
bilateral long cycle. An examination of the nature of 
hegemonic leadership and stability, the origins of 
delegitimation and deconcentration, and the effect of 
economic factors on all of these followed. Additionally, 
one explored the characteristics of a world leader and the 
nature of conflict with respect to Japanese-American 
relations.
24
The main points of this chapter are: (1) one can
adapt global long cycle analysis to explore bilateral 
relations, (2) parallels exist between the fourth stage of 
the first long cycle in Japanese-American relations and 
the current such cycle, and (3) long cycle analysis 
provides the best means of defining the changing nature of 
Japanese-American relations.
\
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CHAPTER 2
In this chapter, the initial phase of the 
Japanese-American relationship is examined within the 
context of the interwar period. Emphasis is on the nature 
of conflicting national interests. The 1922 Washington 
and 1930 London Naval Conferences highlight the first 
bilateral cycle of American deconcentration. This fourth 
stage of deconcentration demonstrates the degree to which 
economic interests dictated military positions. An 
examination of the increasing impact of economic problems 
at home and abroad demonstrate the degree to which 
economic considerations heightened friction between the 
Japanese and United States' governments. Territorial 
expansion, trade practices, the Great Depression, and 
national interests define the basis of deconcentration.
According to Modelski, the fourth stage of every cycle 
exhibits some form of challenge. Within the context of 
Japanese-American trade relations, the interwar period 
demonstrates this fourth stage of deconcentration. With 
the advent of World War I, the United States and Japan 
emerged as new Pacific powers. Both nations had strong
26
economies, vibrant economic growth rates, sizeable navies,
a growing international trade, and long-term interests in
the Pacific. For example, by 1929 Japanese export trade
totaled Y2.604 trillion compared to just Y213 billion in 
2 (51900. Japanese steel manufacturing alone grew from
225,000 tons in 1913 to 2,034,000 tons in 1929.27 The
manufacturing sector virtually doubled its production
between 1925 and 1938 from 313 to 600 percent of 
2 3capacity. Additionally, Japanese banks such the
Industrial Bank of Japan invested in China and the South
Pacific, especially in "enterprises deemed to be of
2 9national importance." As for the United States'
business sector, accounted for 31.4 percent of the world's
3 0manufacturing by 1938. It spent approximately $1,131
trillion on defense in 1938 alone and functioned at 523
31percent of its industrial potential. Both nations were 
also allies of Great Britain, the leader of the nineteenth 
century world, and both strove to replace Great Britain as 
the Pacific's leader. To do so, economic growth, market 
access, and trade expansion were paramount. Under a 
protective wall of tariffs in place since the 1850s, the 
American economy expanded to where American productivity 
rivaled the combined capacity of Great Britain, France, 
and Germany; necessitating its further expansion in the
27
region. The United States also took over Pacific markets
32Great Britain dominated for a century.
Basically, anything the United States' government 
wished to achieve in the Pacific could not happen without 
considering the Japanese government's response.
Conversely, the Japanese government could not act in the
Pacific without considering the American government's
3 3reaction. In 1922, the Pacific experienced tensions
brought about by a naval armaments race and a period of
economic downturn. The major cause of these tensions was
the evolution of the United States and Japan as Pacific
naval and economic powers, coupled with the disintegration
of Great Britain's naval and economic supremacy in the
Pacific at the end of World War I. The Pacific region's
trade and security were of particular importance,
especially as they pertained to the American and Japanese
governments' respective foreign policy actions.
Therefore, an examination of the Washington Naval
Conference is necessary to determine the degree to which
national security considerations influenced the American
and Japanese governments' positions. Different notions of
security were the essential cause of friction and of
34failure for the Washington Naval Conference. The 
security interests of the United States' government were 
quite different from those of the Japanese government. As
28
the preeminent trading nation in the world, the United 
States' government's concerns centered around trade. That 
trade required a naval component capable of defending
global commerce, supporting the Monroe Doctrine, and
. 3 5upholding American sovereignty in the Pacific. The
United States had to achieve naval parity with Great
Britain and to maintain its naval and economic superiority
over Japan to defend its Pacific trade interests. Naval
expansion was the primary way to ensure continued American
control over Philippine and Southeast Asian trade lanes.
Although strategic and technological advantages were 
the United States' delegation's stated reasons for 
attending the Washington Naval Conference, economic issues 
were the true rationale. Additionally, the United States' 
Navy needed to break the existing British-Japanese naval 
alliance in order to eliminate an unfavorable military 
balance in the Pacific. Unless it broke the alliance, the 
British and Japanese navies could potentially exclude the 
United States' merchant marine from participating in the 
lucrative Pacific trade.36 As long as the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance held, the United States' Commonwealth of the 
Philippines could be attacked and seized by either by the 
British navy from Singapore and Hong Kong or by the 
Japanese navy from islands seized from Germany during 
World War I.37
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While these issues necessitated prompt action, the
American government's official goals were: (1) the
limitation of naval armaments, (2) the establishment of
rules governing the use of new weapons, and (3) the
3 8l-imitation of land armaments. By limiting naval 
armaments, the relatively undeveloped American navy 
effectively halted expansion by the British and Japanese 
navies in areas where the American navy was weak. This 
gave the American navy a chance to catch up and, most 
importantly, the ability to protect its Pacific 
territories. Rules governing the usage of new weapons 
also gave the American navy time to formulate plans for 
the defeat or rebuff of any potential aggressive actions 
against its important commercial holdings in the Pacific. 
The same applied for the land armaments' limitations. The 
added impetus of the United States' Army's long line of 
supplies dictated requirements for the protection of the 
Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands. The unstated 
purpose for the United States' government convening the 
conference was to: (1) cancel the British-Japanese
military alliance, (2) resolve the question of what to do 
with the Pacific islands seized by the Japanese military 
from the German government during World War I, and (3) 
halt the Japanese military's imperialist aspirations in
30
3 9China and Siberia. The rationale behind these goals was 
simple.
If the United States' government could cancel the
Anglo-Japanese alliance, it could consolidate and
gradually expand its mercantile interests in the Pacific.
By resolving whether Japan could keep islands seized in
World War I from Germany, the United States' government
hoped to contain Japanese territorial and economic
expansion in the region by giving the Japanese government
a non-threatening outlet for territorial and trade
expansion. This outlet would also help to curb Japanese
industrial and territorial expansion into China, and
benefit American business interests. Finally, by ending
further Japanese expansion in China and Siberia, the
American business community had continued access to the
potentially huge Chinese market. Furthermore, to continue v
to pursue its Open Door policy in China, the United
States' government had to have a navy capable of defeating
4 0both the British and Japanese navies simultaneously.
For the Japanese government, security interests were
more complicated. The Japanese government faced a rapidly
increasing population and insufficient arable land to
support its population's food requirements. The Japanese
government looked to the Asian mainland for continued
41growth and survival. The Japanese government believed
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it needed land to ease growing population strains, to
provide sufficient food to support a burgeoning
population, and to provide raw materials to fuel its
industrial growth. The Japanese government saw
colonization of Siberia and Manchuria as the way to do 
42so. The Japanese government and Army also saw mainland
possessions, Korea (acquired in 1894 from China) and the
Shantung Peninsula (acquired in during World War I from
Germany), as critical to Japan's external defense and
long-term economic interests as they provided markets for 
4 3its goods . This was especially true after American
Congressional tariff restrictions virtually killed off
44Japanese business' important North American trade. The
Japanese government also worried about the presence of
American military bases in the Philippines, Guam, and
Hawaii as well as British military bases in Hong Kong and
Singapore. The Japanese government and military
leadership saw arms negotiations as a way to prevent the
American and British military forces from challenging
4 5Japan's position in the Pacific.
Thus the Japanese delegation had several objectives. 
The Japanese government sought: (1) guaranteed
international security and peace, (2) mandatory arms 
limitations, (3) settlement of the Far East question, (4) 
recognition of racial equality, and (5)augmentation of its
32
4 6national prestige. The Japanese government hoped 
negotiations with the United States' government would 
break its alliance with Great Britain and forestall 
expansion of the British mercantile and naval presence in 
the Pacific. The continued British military and 
mercantile presence in the Pacific was detrimental to the 
Japanese government's long-term economic and military 
goals.
During the conference, the Japanese government agreed
to return the Shantung Peninsula to the Chinese
4 7government. The Japanese delegation also promised to 
evacuate Japanese troops and civilians from Russian 
territory seized in the Russo-Japanese War. Additionally, 
the delegation agreed to prevent the further territorial 
disintegration of China and to limit military armaments. 
These concessions were significant in that the Japanese 
government virtually agreed to expand no further in China, 
thus curtailing its access to the Chinese market. This 
meant that Japanese businesses would have to look 
elsewhere for both supplies and consumers. By agreeing to 
the armament limitations, the Japanese government also 
accepted a relatively inferior position in the Pacific as 
its navy would only have local hegemony in Japanese 
territorial waters.
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In the armaments limitations treaty, capital ships 
(i.e. battleships) were limited to a 5:5:3 ratio (five for 
Great Britain, five for the United States, and three for 
Japan) with the guarantee to the Japanese government that 
no islands held by the American or British governments 
would be fortified. In effect, the American navy received 
tacit permission to replace the British navy as the 
regional peace keeper and master of the southern Pacific 
trade lanes. At the same time, the Japanese navy received 
de facto control of the northern Pacific trade lanes.
Additionally, the United States' and Japanese governments
48achieved a better working relationship.
Despite these achievements, no limitations were set on
49auxiliary vessels, land, or air forces. This left the 
door open for possible aggression and continued expansion 
in the region by all parties. Anti-Japanese trade and 
immigration policies were not revised by the United 
States' government. This allowed room among the Japanese 
military and people for resentment and the need for future 
expansion on the Chinese mainland to ease population 
strains. The arms race shifted from capital ships to 
cruisers. The United States' government was still unable 
to protect its territories in the Pacific as it could not 
build defenses under the treaty. There was also no way to 
force the British navy to maintain parity with the
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American navy, further fueling doubts about the United
5 0States' government's peaceful intentions in the region.
This also antagonized the Japanese business community by
implying the American navy would ensure American
businesses' access to ports which were equally essential
to Japanese business interests. This loophole left the
issue of which nation's navy would control the Pacific
trade lanes open to continued debate. These failures
provided friction in Japanese-American relations and
necessitated the London Naval Conference.
Eight years after the Washington Naval Conference,
isolationist sentiment in the United States was stronger
than ever due to the Depression and the unsettling
influence of the Japanese military's and government's
51territorial and political aggression. ' Most importantly,
Nationalist turmoil in China threatened Japanese trade
interests at a time when the Japanese business community
52could ill afford to lose markets. It is important to
note that approximately 25 percent of Japan's exports went
to China at the time; therefore, disruption of trade with
53China devastated the Japanese economy.
Additionally, social and political lines were sharply
54dislocated m  Japan. According to Modelski's model, 
these dislocations characterize Japan as a rival power 
during the interwar period. The Japanese people and navy
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also felt angry about the inferior position the nation was
55assigned by the Washington Naval Treaty. To improve its 
standing at home the Japanese government agreed to
cooperate with British and the United States1 governments
56and attend a new conference. The Japanese government
hoped a new treaty would result in better terms and
alleviate some of the pressure it was under. It also
hoped for improved American trade relations and a freer
hand in China.
Further fueling the growing air of conflict, the
balance of naval power shifted from a situation where
there was no predominant naval power to one where the
Japanese navy was clearly in control of the Pacific.
Because of the loopholes in the Washington Naval Treaty, t
the Japanese navy expanded until had the ability to defeat
the British and American navies. This shift precipitated
a new American naval build-up directed at the Japanese
navy. It also sent notice to the Japanese government that
the American government would act to defend American
business interests in the region.
Furthermore, the American and Japanese governments'
perceptions of security needs were at odds once more and
57the Philippines was at the heart of the debate. The 
Philippines was a rich source of raw resources and the 
archipelago formed a strategic choke point across the
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trade lanes to the Dutch territory of Java (Indonesia).
This choke point posed a critical problem for the Japanese 
government as oil from Royal Dutch Shell wells in the 
Javanese archipelago and via tanker from the Arabian 
peninsula were the only known alternative to American 
crude oil. In the event of war or further disintegration 
of Japanese-American diplomatic relations, the Japanese 
government had to have access to Dutch oil or face the 
collapse of Japanese industry. Access to Philippine 
waters was the only way to guarantee the oil supply.
Despite the failure of the Washington Naval Conference 
to resolve previous regional frictions, the Japanese and 
the United States' governments tried to avert conflict in 
stage four of their relationship by attending the 1930 
London Naval Conference. This conference failed because 
it tried to solve bilateral economic problems by resorting N 
to naval disarmament instead of addressing the economic 
factor of conflicting Pacific trade interests. The 
Japanese delegation's goals were: (1) the acknowledgment
of the Japanese government's right to the Shantung 
peninsula, (2) the legal transfer of German territories 
north of the Equator to the Japanese government, and (3) 
the recognition of racial equality. These points were 
part of the Japanese government's Twenty-one Demands.
These demands solidified Japanese political, economic, and
37
military control over Northern China, Inner Mongolia, and 
Manchuria and extended Japanese political and commercial
C  Q
influence in China.
Aside from the Japanese delegation's goals, the
conference's goals were to: (1) repudiate colonial
imperialism, (2) limit all combat vessels, and (3)
59establish a balance of power. By repudiating colonial 
imperialism, the American and British governments hoped to 
keep the Japanese government from any military adventures 
in China. By limiting naval vessels, those governments 
also hoped to preserve their navies' respective spheres of 
influence. By establishing a balance of power, the 
British and American governments hoped to maintain their 
economic and naval positions in the Pacific and to prevent 
the Japanese government from attempting to augment its 
position in the region. Finally, by curbing military 
expenditures, all of the governments hoped to free capital 
to support economies suffering from the Great Depression.
While the overall conference goals were clear-cut, the 
resolution of national goals was difficult. The Japanese 
government hnd navy wanted 70-percent parity in auxiliary 
vessels (i. e. destroyers, cruisers, submarines) to secure 
continued Japanese access to the Pacific trade lanes and 
markets.60 The Japanese delegation discounted submarines 
as their role was defensive.
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Although workable on the surface, the negotiations
faltered. Conflicting Japanese and American economic
interests fueled this failure. The Japanese government
had a vested interest in Philippine neutrality. Trade in
vital food stuffs and natural resources exported by the
Philippines was necessary to support the flagging Japanese
economy. Future Japanese economic hegemony also depended
on the dismemberment of American and British naval bases
in the Pacific. The Japanese Navy also saw the United
States' naval building program as a direct threat aimed at
Japanese regional economic interests, especially those in 
(5 XChina. This perception was probably correct given the 
continued interest in China by American business and the 
subsequent need to support access to the China trade by 
means of forcibly keeping open American trade concessions 
over both Japanese business and Chinese Nationalist 
objections.
As for the United States' government, its position as
a Pacific power greatly determined the American
delegation's demands. The concentration of American trade
interests in the Philippines and recent economic ties in
China and in Korea made it imperative for the United
62States' Navy to have preeminence in the Pacific. Adding 
to the dilemma was the United States' government's policy 
toward China. Its desire to maintain the Open Door trade
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policy with the Nationalist government of China put the 
United States' government in direct opposition to future 
Japanese economic and territorial expansion in China.
Upon completion of the treaty, the Japanese 
government faced the problems of increased militarism, a 
discredited parliament, and growing expansionist sentiment 
in the military and business sectors. Underlying these 
problems was the economic condition of the Japanese 
people. Because Japanese business depended' upon British 
and American trade, the Japanese delegation could not 
openly refuse to sign the treaty, no matter how
& 3detrimental it seemed to Japan's national interests.
The worldwide Depression accounted for major economic,
social, and political dislocations in Japan and caused the
per capita income in Japan to fall over fifty percent when
64the United States' market for rice and silk collapsed.
By signing the treaty, Japanese government
negotiators hoped for better business and economic 
65treatment. However, the perception by the Japanese 
military and public that the treaty did not address 
Japanese needs weakened the government's credibility. The 
Japanese press also alleged advantages were not exploited 
by the Japanese delegation during the Conference.
Finally, the Japanese civilian government collapsed. The
• i • • • 6 (5Japanese military invaded Manchuria m  1931.
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Before its 1902 war with Russia and its acquisition
of German Pacific island territories during World War I,
the Japanese government saw expansion as a way to further
its economic interests and to lessen the tremendous
overcrowding occasioned by the doubling of its population
between 1890 and 1913. 67 Military and business circles
believed expansion could avert national catastrophe;
therefore, Japanese intervention in Manchuria would
strengthen Japan economically and provide an outlet for
68its booming population growth.
In short, the London Naval Conference failed because 
it addressed naval versus trade interests. One has only 
to compare statistics to see just how far Japanese 
industrialization and economic growth came since the 
1890s:
\
TOTAL POPULATION
U. S.
JAPAN
1890
62.6
39.9
1938 
138 .3 
72 .2
(millions)
URBAN POPULATION 
1890
U. S. 15.3
6.3
1938 
32.8 
28. 6JAPAN
(millions) 69
During this period, both countries' populations doubled. 
Within a fifty year span, the degree of urbanization in
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Japan quintupled compared to the United States' urban 
population.
INDUSTRIALIZATION
8
1880 
U. S. -38
JAPAN 10
1938
167
38
(capacity)
IRON & STEEL PRODUCTION
U. S .
JAPAN
1880 
9 . 3 
0.2
1938
28.8
7.0
(% world market) 70
Here again Japanese industry made great strides, despite 
its virtual lack of natural resources.
ENERGY CONSUMPTION
1890 1938
U. S. 147 697
JAPAN 4.6 96.5
(million metric tons)
INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL
1880 1938
U. S. 45.9 528
JAPAN 7.6 88
(%. realized)
Compared to the United States' admitted industrial lead, 
Japanese business came out of the Dark Ages to the
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twentieth century at an astonishing rate, much faster than 
American business in the nineteenth century.
WORLD MANUFACTURING MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION
U. S.
JAPAN
1938 
•31.4 
2 . 0
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION
1938 
U. S. 143
JAPAN 552
(rate of production) 72
The astounding productivity of Japanese business, although 
accounting for a small share of world production, gave the 
American business community pause.
DEFENSE SPENDING
U. S.
JAPAN
1938
1131
2489
(million $)
WAR MAKING POTENTIAL 
1937
U. S 41.7
JAPAN 31.5
(relative capacity)
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION 
1937
U. S. 2195
JAPAN 44 67
(thousands/year)
73
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GNP & % SPENT ON DEFENSE 
1937
U. S. 68 1.5
JAPAN 4 28.2
($billions) (%GNP)
Japanese industrial capacity grew tremendously between 
1890 and 1939. The United States was the only other 
Pacific nation which experienced such rapid population 
growth and industrial production. Japanese and American 
industry produced such a volume goods that they required 
greater shares of foreign markets to handle their excess 
industrial capacity. Neither countries' markets could 
absorb the abundance of cheap, mass-produced goods.
Furthermore, by spending so much on its defense 
sector, the Japanese government virtually bankrupted 
itself. Without access to more markets- and a continued 
high growth rate, the Japanese government faced disaster. 
Japanese business had no choice but to move into American 
business enclaves. This necessitated virtual trade 
warfare. Because of the emergence of Japan as an 
industrial power in the Pacific and its ability to 
challenge American interests in the region, the question 
of discriminatory trade practices emerged as yet another 
source of friction between the Japanese and the United 
States' governments.
Because the continued access to Pacific markets 
depended on internal security and international peace, the
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Japanese government interfered in turbulent Chinese
7 5domestic politics. By doing so, it challenged American 
leadership and the American government's political and 
economic policies as advocated by Secretary of State John 
Hay in 1900.
Although the Japanese government originally proposed
that if "the United States would not challenge Japan's
position in Manchuria; Japan would permit American
investment in the region," this challenge to the status
quo was another sign of regional instability and of the
existing tensions.^6 A joint statement by Secretary of
State Lansing and Viscount Ishii on November 2, 1927
"affirmed the 'Open Door' principle and respect for
Chinese 'integrity,' and agreed that Japan has special
interests in China, particularly in the part to which her
77possessions are contiguous."
With its growing reliance on lucrative trade 
generated by shipping raw and finished goods from the 
Philippines to America, the United States' Congress passed 
laws which favored Philippine imports and were detrimental 
to Japanese'businesses. The Congress increased taxes on 
major Japanese exports such as "camphor, pottery, cotton 
textiles, furniture, . . . silk textiles and toys",
7 8virtually killing the American import trade with Japan.
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Consequently, while the Depression preoccupied the
United States' government with the problems of massive
unemployment and economic paralysis, Pacific region trade
interests became critical to American economic health.
Accompanying the United States' economic collapse, the
worldwide depression hit Japan and created great hardship.
To shore up its economic health, the Japanese government
7 9turned to expansionist policies.
The Depression caused massive dislocations in all
areas related to Japan's commercial interests. The price
of Japanese goods in 1930 fell 35 percent, decreasing
8 0business profits greatly. "The chief source of the
economic difficulties . . . was the fall in raw silk
prices . . . by 50 percent and silk exports . . . were
only 53 percent in value (although 82 p'ercent in weight)
of those in 1929."81 To counter the effects of the
collapse, Japanese business aggressively exported finished
goods (roughly 4 3 percent to the United States alone in 
8 21929.) The Japanese government placed a 25 percent tax
on imported textiles, gave subsidies to the sugar,
shipping, shipbuilding, and railroad industries, and
8 3exempted iron and steel producers from taxes.
Additionally, the Japanese government played an active
84role by aiding industry m  exporting to foreign markets.
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Economic rivalry and the use of trade as an instrument of
8 5Japanese economic policy became established practices.
With mainland concessions seemingly imperiled,
domestic Japanese economic needs were threatened by the
p.otential loss of foreign trade from areas where the
8 6Japanese government exercised political control. Japan
felt it could neither maintain the right to nor the ideal
of the coprosperity sphere unless it fought the United
8 7States for mercantile hegemony in the Pacific.
Ultimately, the Japanese government's policies of 
trade, military, and territorial expansionism led to 
conflict (World War II) because of several key economic 
factors. These factors were: (l)high American tariffs 
against Japanese products, (2)the Japanese government's 
need to acquire territory in order to ease population 
problems, (3)the need to ensure a continued flow of raw 
resources (i.e., oil and steel) to Japan to support its 
continued industrial expansion and high growth rate, and 
(4)the need to ensure access to markets for its finished 
products.
By examining the nature of Japanese and American 
national interests and the degree to which economic 
concerns influenced these interests, one explained the 
fourth phase of Modelski's long cycle. The use of the 
1922 Washington Naval Conference to highlight the impact
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of economic interests upon policy choices further 
underscored the economic nature of Pacific conflict. The 
economic impact of the Depression and the importance of 
Pacific markets to the Japanese and American governments 
highlighted the military and economic tensions in this 
stage of deconcentration. The key to this chapter is 
territorial expansion, trade practices, and national 
economic interests contributed to the Japanese economic 
challenge. The Washington and London Naval Conferences 
indicated the depth the economic environment affected 
policy positions and outcomes. The economic origins of 
conflict in stage four of the last bilateral long cycle 
contributed to World War II. Because one now knows the 
factors which caused deconcentration in the preceding 
fourth long cycle, one can now examine the current fourth 
cycle to see if similar factors exist.
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CHAPTER 3
This chapter examines the impact of economic changes 
on the post World War II Japanese-American relationship. 
Specifically, it covers the economic origins of stability 
and delegitimation. The current stage of the relationship 
is also compared to the interwar period to see if 
parallels exist. Because of these economic 
considerations, it is possible the Japanese government may 
challenge and try to replace the United States' government 
as the leader in the Pacific in the current stage of 
deconcentration. The economic indicators used to support 
this premise are GNP, GDP, volume of trade, export levels, 
productivity, balance of trade, and investment.
While the United States-Japan relationship was tense 
in the interwar period, it ended in war during the first 
stage of the current long cycle. After World War II, 
stage two of the current long cycle saw the United States' 
government emerge as the unquestioned economic, military, 
and political leader. The Japanese government, although 
defeated during stage one of the current bilateral cycle, 
became the United States' government's staunchest ally in
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the Pacific during stage two. This alliance mirrors the
American government's pre-World War II relationship with
the British government.
During the second stage of the American cycle,
Japanese businessmen and the Japanese government again
adopted American economic policies and practices. They
adapted them to meet Japanese manufacturing sector needs.
The Japanese government also retained its turn of the
century and interwar period practice of extensive
governmental involvement in trade and manufacturing. This
involvement included export, shipping, and industrial
subsidies plus extensive intervention in "heavy industry,
8 8iron, steel and shipbuilding". Japan became one of them
most advanced countries in the world due to its industrial
infrastructure and literate, nationalistic, cohesive 
89populace. It also had the added impetus of available 
capital and protection of its trade lanes courtesy of the 
United States' Navy.
During this second stage, Japanese industry 
experienced fantastic growth fueled by the rapid influx of 
American capital. This is important because, in long 
cycle theory, the leader must co-opt other powers by 
economic incentives as well as military power. During 
this stage of hegemonic leadership, American industry and 
the American government had the resources necessary to
co-opt the Japanese government and industry. One has only 
to look at the following figures to see just how quickly 
Japanese industry recovered from the devastation of 
American bombing in World War II:
GROSS SHARE OF WORLD PRODUCTION
U. S. 25.9% (1960)
21.5% (1980)
JAPAN 4.5% (1960) 9.0% (1980)
PER CAPITA
U. S.
$381
JAPAN $3 82
PER CAPITA
U. S.
$2,590
JAPAN $9,890
These figures are important as they underscore the United 
States' relative industrial decline and Japanese 
industry's climb. While American industry's share of 
world production declined between 1960 and 1980, Japanese 
industry's doubled. Where Japanese GNP was only 10% of 
American GNP in 1950, it was almost 50% of American GNP in 
1980. This reflects the exceptional strides Japanese 
industry made during phases two and three of the current
1950 GNP
TOTAL
$2,536
$32 
(billion) 
1980 GNP
TOTAL 
$11,360
$1,157 
(billion)
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cycle and the degree to which the American government's
position switched from unrivaled to seriously challenged.
Part of the reason for this challenge is the impact
American capital investment had on Japanese business.
Between the 1950s and mid-1970s, orders for goods
made in Japan to supply American troops in Korea, Vietnam,
and Japan poured in. Toyota is one example of the effect
this spending had on Japan. Toyota "was in danger of
foundering when it was rescued by the first of the U. S.
91Defense Department's orders for its trucks". Now,
Toyota is one of the largest, most modern, most
competitive automobile manufacturers in the world.
Additionally, Japanese exports in 1951 almost tripled
over their 194 9 level and production increased 70 
92percent. The dollars generated by U.' S. Army purchases
soared from $590 million in 1951 to over $800 million in
both 1952 and 1953 enabling Japan to purchase "$2 billion
in imports [to] . . . key industries [to] . . .virtually
9 3double their scale of production." "From the Vietnam
War . . . increases iri America's dollar outflows 
94accelerated."
During this second stage of bilateral stability, 
Japanese trade with the United States flourished.
American military protection and capital ensured peace and 
security needs. Gradually, Japanese business shifted from
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supplying cheap consumer goods like textiles to supplying 
inexpensive electronics. Japanese industry upgraded 
products to meet American market needs and invested in 
technology and long-term growth. The demands of the 
Korean War and the reinstatement of the zaibatsu
95occasioned much of this growth m  industrial goods.
With a centralized production system provided by
zaibatsu. the ability to produce trucks and equipment for
the U. S. Army accelerated. Additionally, the revenues
generated by U. S. Army purchases encouraged further
96investment m  plant, equipment, and technology. While
the electronics and nuclear technology fields developed
during World War II; Japanese business integrated imported
technologies into those industries as well as into the
engineering, industrial machinery, and shipbuilding 
97industries. The combination of imported technologies
created low-cost mass production systems. This furthered
Japanese industry's transfer to advanced product 
98marketing. Thus, Japanese industry flourished under
American military protection, with American investment, 
and because1of the American government's attempts to 
maintain stability in the Pacific.
Although the United States was the region's economic, 
political, and military leader from the end of World War 
II to the mid 1960s, the late 1960s saw the era of
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American political and military hegemony end. A third 
stage in the cycle occurred, that of delegitimation. The 
United Nations, long an American forum, became the voice 
of the Third World. The United States1 government faced 
political challenge from the Soviet Union in Vietnam and 
economically by the 1973 Arab oil embargo. What was good 
for the United States' government was no longer accepted 
by the majority of the region's nations. Even the 
Japanese government, the American government's major 
Pacific ally, changed.
While the nature of the change was not violent or
sudden, it challenged American business views of the
Pacific market. During this period Japanese business
rapidly expanded trade by producing for both the regional
and the American markets. It averaged an unmatched 10.5%
99growth rate m  its domestic product. The Japanese 
business community discarded free market trade propounded 
by the United States business community and government as 
invalid and insufficient to meet its needs. The Japanese 
practices of protected trade, economic planning, and 
continuous reinvestment in plants, equipment, and 
technology worked for Japanese industry.
In short, American business practices and the role of 
American capital faced a challenge from Japanese business 
and capital because the American business community was
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unable to provide economic and military security. The 
Vietnam War was too large a drain on available resources 
and the Japanese government and business community had to 
step in to fill the gap. Trade protectionism sheltered 
fledgling electronics and automotive industries, enabling 
them to grow, improve, and sell free of competition. 
Another sign of the onset of delegitimation was the 
creation of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) as an agency for channeling capital, 
facilitating trade, and promoting the needs of Japanese 
industry. MITI encouraged and coordinated industrial and 
technological change and advancement. MITI became 
necessary to Japanese industry's economic well-being.
With the advent of the MITI in the 1950s, the 
Japanese government began to operate independently of the 
American government's trade policies. Japanese industry 
became a Pacific trade contender. Japanese industry's 
challenge to the American government's position as the 
Pacific's economic leader is most pronounced in the areas 
of high technology goods market share.
Within a decade, Japan's shipyards were producing 
over half of the world's tonnage of launchings. By 
the 1970s, its . . . steelworks were turning out as 
much as the American steel industry. [And] between 
1960 and 1984 its share of world car production rose 
from 1 percent to 2 3 percent . . . the country moved 
. . . to high technology products —  to computers,
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telecommunications, aerospace, robotics, and 
biotechnology . . .  By the late 1970s the Japanese 
GNP was . . . more than half the size of America's.
Within one generation, its share of world 
manufacturing output, and of GNP, had risen from 
around 2-3 percent to around 10 percent. n_
At the same time, the United States' industrial lead 
steadily slipped.
The purpose, of this chapter was to demonstrate the 
origins of stability and delegitimation. By concentrating 
on these stages, the shift from military to economic 
leadership as the critical measure of stability is 
apparent. This economic element is the main factor in 
rising instability in the current long cycle.
\
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CHAPTER FOUR
In the early 1980s, the United States' government 
entered upon the final stage of this long cycle, 
deconcentration. No longer is the United States' 
government and business community the unquestioned 
political and economic leader. There is no longer a 
communist threat around which to rally the American 
government's client states or to serve as the focus of its 
foreign policy. The Japanese government now acts 
independently of the United States' government and 
challenges it for a greater leadership role in the 
Pacific.
Underscoring this potential challenge to the leader, 
one has only to look at the importance of Pacific trade to 
see which way the balance leans. Non-American Pacific GDP
increased from 7.8 percent in 1960 to 16.4 percent in
102 . . .1982. IN 1960, American trade with the Pacific equated
103to only 48 percent of its trade with Europe. By 1983,
American trade with the Pacific escalated to approximately
104122 percent of its business with Europe. By 1987, the
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region accounted for 4 3 percent of the entire world’s 
GNP.105
While stage two of the current long cycle indicated 
the United States' government was the senior partner in 
the relationship, the contemporary period indicates a 
change in the relationship. In the current situation, the 
Japanese government may become the senior partner by 
virtue of its favorable balance of trade and its control 
of investment capital available to finance the United 
States' government's enormous debt.
With the changes currently underway in this period of 
deconcentration, one must start with the assumption that 
Japan may become the predominant partner in 
Japanese-American trade relations. For proof of this 
premise, one has only to look at current trade surpluses 
in Japan and with the Four Tigers. The United States' 
government is dealing with them from a position of debtor. 
The unwillingness of Japanese businesses and the Japanese 
government to accede to the trade demands of President 
Bush and the Big Three auto makers (Chrysler, General 
Motors and Ford) during their February 1992 visit to Japan 
underscores this tenet.
Finally, this assumption highlights the fact that the 
issues of trade and economics in Japan and the United 
States are ever more important to policy makers. Because
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economic considerations drive the ability of a state to 
become a leader, it is imperative one examine these 
issues. Among these concerns are: (1) How did this
situation evolve? (2) Will it remain the same? (3) Can 
the United States regain its past position of preeminence? 
(4) To what extent does American economic malaise affect 
Japan? The answers to these questions point to the 
interdependence which exists and to a probable gradual 
decline in Japan's trade advantage as the American economy 
continues to deteriorate. This is important because, if 
the Japanese government is to replace the United States1 
government as the leader, it must either wean itself from 
the American market, or work to reinvigorate the American 
economy. The relationship and its potential course are 
relevant from a contemporary policy standpoint as future 
American and Japanese foreign policy may be based on 
similar questions. Additionally, because trade and 
economic conditions occasioned the last Japanese-American 
conflict in the Pacific, one must determine the extent of 
current economic frictions.
One must outline how competition, trade practices, 
trade surpluses, and the Japanese government's outlook on 
trade with the United States may impact the next cycle. 
First, competition is the means of ensuring Japan's 
economic survival. The key aspect of competition is the
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pursuit of what is good for Japanese business and, 
ultimately, the Japanese nation. For example, American 
car manufacturers accused Japanese car manufacturers of 
dumping cars on the American market to unfairly gain 
market share.
Despite the success of this practice, Japanese car 
manufacturers curbed exports to the European market. They 
did this to secure a potentially larger quota share in the 
unified European market.106 Although this move helped the 
Europeans during the 1991 recession, the intent was to 
gain and maintain market access necessary for continued 
Japanese expansion and economic well-being. It was a well 
thought-out market strategy.
While the American business community deems Japanese 
business practices invalid, the Japanese approach to 
competition effectively ensured Japanese business' 
viability. Closely linked to the issue of competition is 
that of Japanese trade practices. Formal and informal 
barriers are among the most persistent means of 
controlling access to domestic and foreign markets. A 
close examination of keiretsu, a modern day version of 
zaibatsu. give a good idea of how these barriers work. 
Keiretsu are "large, financially linked groups of 
companies" which form the backbone of the Japanese 
economy.107 These firms buy from their subsidiaries and
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from each other before turning to outside agencies for 
material or equipment. This practice precludes external 
trade and inhibits access to the Japanese market. The 
resulting profits remain in country and further encourage 
huge trade surpluses. These practices mirror the role of 
Japanese industry and government during the last period of 
deconcentration.
During the interwar period, the Japanese government
and business community engaged in similar practices in
China and Manchuria. Zaibatsu, the predecessor of
keiretsu. performed the same function in the interwar
period. Zaibatsu were "certain great Japanese business
houses with extremely widespread interests. The four
major [ones] were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda.
These concerns played a vital part in the economic rise of
Japan. . . [and] their importance was not limited to the
economic sphere, for they made their influence felt in
politics. . . [as they] became agents for the execution of
the Government's economic policy" and economic power was
108concentrated in them. In stage one of the current
cycle, these practices led to increased economic, 
political and military tensions between the Japanese and 
American governments. While attempts to allay these 
tensions took the form of the Washington and London Naval 
Conferences, they were directly tied to trade frictions.
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While the Japanese and American governments engaged 
in a trade war of tariffs, barriers, rhetoric, currency 
manipulation, and conflicting economic needs in the 
previous fourth stage, this led to open warfare. The 
c.urrent fourth stage exhibits some of the same economic 
frictions. Today, Japanese markets which appear tightly 
closed against American goods while American markets are 
full of Japanese products. In stage four, Japanese 
business expanded trade aggressively into South Korea, 
Thailand, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
These were traditional American markets in stage two.
Today the Japanese government bars American agricultural 
products by stiff tariffs. This is because of political 
agitation by Japanese rice and beef lobbies. In the 
interwar period, the American government barred Japanese 
rice and silk exports with prohibitive tariffs.
While the United States' Navy has naval supremacy and 
control of Pacific trade lanes, Japanese business has the 
economic power to forestall American moves. In stage four 
of the last bilateral cycle, the Japanese Navy had 
regional control and the United States' government had 
economic control. American economic power steadily 
declined relative to Japan's rapid economic advancement in 
stage three. The Japanese government's ability to conduct 
yen diplomacy parallels the United States' government's
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pre-World War II ability to conduct dollar diplomacy.
Contrary to the American government's interwar period 
interest in promoting disarmament, the United States' 
government now wants the Japanese government to assume 
some of the Pacific's defense burden.
If the United States' government pursues a policy of
self-interest and self-preservation to counter the
possible Japanese challenge, a trade war may occur. The
pursuit of bilateral leadership in this period of
deconcentration and challenge could lead the Japanese
government to act out of its own trade interests. Such
action could prevent the United States1 government from
109achieving its own security (i.e., economic) needs. If
this occurs, a Japanese government that can say no could 
destabilize the region. It could undermine American 
Pacific leadership to the extent that a new leader would '
replace the faltering American leadership in a new cycle 
of conflict, stability, delegitimation, and 
deconcentration.
Contributing regional instability and 
deconcentration, Japanese trade practices weaken the 
American government's economic and political influence by 
eating away at American trade. Keiretsu discourage 
imports and hurt other exporting nations because of 
unequal access. Within the context of Modelski's long
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cycles, one can argue that an examination of trade 
interests and their military and economic ramifications, 
may enable one to forecast the path an emerging conflict 
may take.
For an example of just how successfully Japanese 
trade dominates markets, one has only to look at trade 
figures. Japan's trade surpluses grew 35.3 percent in May 
1991 to US$4.18 billion, the United States absorbed 
massive deficits of US$1.95 billion.110 The more durable 
goods an industrialized nation exports, the better off it 
is. Conversely, the more durable goods an industrialized 
nation imports, the less well off it is. Imports are 
drains on domestic capital. When a nation imports more 
than it exports, "tension and a dangerous situation 
[arise]" for the exporting country.111 * Within Modelski's 
framework, one sees these tensions as the basis of 
conflict during the period of deconcentration immediately 
preceding a new long cycle.
Despite the current tendency of Japanese industry to 
build factories outside of Japan to off-set production 
costs, trade surpluses-still exist. Keiretsu enable 
companies to manufacture goods cheaply, sell them at 
competitive prices, and still not have to purchase 
components from non-Japanese companies. Keiretsu deepens 
trade imbalances by expanding Japan's trade surplus. They
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also add to the air of instability.
Aside from these considerations, the Japanese 
people's view of the United States' government and 
citizenry must be taken into account.
This view is an indicator of power or perceived power 
shifts. In the past, the Japanese government saw the 
United States' business community as a role model in 
manufacturing, technology, and trade practices. The 
United States' government was a friend and a potential 
rival in the Pacific (previous stage four). Japanese 
industry impressed the United States citizenry by its 
transformation of Japan from a backward, feudal, insular 
nation to a modern military and economic power capable of 
threatening American interests in the Pacific (previous 
stage four). These perceptions reflected the nature of 
the power relationship in the interwar period.
Then as now, the United States was Japanese
industry's primary trade partner and extremely important
to its continued economic growth and well-being. Today,
as Japanese industry's target market and primary trade
partner, the United States' market plays an equally
critical role in the Japanese economy. As the Japanese
government sees things, the United States' government has
to "resolve fundamental economic . . problems and to pay
112its debts" if it wants to be competitive. The existing
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American national deficit is a function of the United
States' government's status as the world's largest debtor
nation and its "propensity to spend beyond its means"
113versus Japanese business competition. This attitude
indicates there is a fundamental change underway in the
relationship.
According to Japanese government and business
leaders, if American businesses want to be competitive,
they have to invest in more plants and equipment. The
American government must undertake rigorous educational
reform and get the political system to work more
effectively. The root of the United States' government's
economic problem is the basic need for the United States'
government to act responsibly at home. The trade surplus
is not Japanese business' fault, but that of a soft,
decadent American government and industries which lack the s
moral fiber to enact tough reforms.
Today, Japan sees itself as a nation of sharp
businessmen who pursued advantages, while American
business failed to accept the challenge of market
development'due to sloth, complacency, and a dulled sense 
114of competition. Japanese businessmen blame the trade
deficit on the American cost structure, low savings rate, 
lack of long-term investment, declining industrial 
production, and Congressional unwillingness to reduce the
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115budget deficit. These stereotypes highlight the
growing perception among the Japanese people that the
United States is in decline and that Japan is resurgent
and assuming superiority in the relationship.
Whether these generalizations are valid or not, they
fail to address the reality of market interdependence and
the possible affect this may have on determining the
future leader. Because of the extensive interdependence
of the Japanese and American markets, the Japanese economy
is vulnerable to the continued weakness of the American
economy. Just as the American stock market crash and
subsequent Depression in the interwar period devastated
the Japanese economy, a collapse of the American economy
would affect it again. For example, in 1983 alone
American direct investment in Japan amounted to US$8,059
1 <1 ^
billion and US$20.67 billion in the Pacific as a whole. s
Of that amount, fully US$4,071 billion was invested in
Japanese industry and US$2,011 was invested in 
117petroleum. Additionally, 1983 Japanese investment in
the United States accounted for US$8,878 billion in
industry, US$4,856 billion in services, and US$2,056
118billion in manufacturing. If the American economy
collapsed, even as early as 1983, the effects would spread 
to the most important sectors of the Japanese and American 
economies.
67
For a complete view of the United States' decline as
regional leader, one has to consider the American popular
view of Japan. The rationale is simple: it reflects the
uneasiness in American public opinion about the role of
Japan and the ability of the United States' government to
remain the dominant partner in the relationship. The
Japanese government's unwillingness to grant trade
concessions fuels the popular American perception of Japan
119as a spoiler out to destroy American trade interests.
The need for trade concessions reflects the belief that
the United States is losing control. The closed nature of
Japanese markets heightens what American businesses see as
an arcane distribution system which precludes efficient
120distribution of goods. Fear of potential Japanese
control of American domestic capital investment fuels
121American attitudes. At the heart of American criticism N
of Japan is the trade deficit and the fear of Japanese
domination in world markets.
For example, a Department of Defense report hailed
the Japanese as " 'amoral, manipulative and controlling'
. . . [people] . . . motivated by economic concerns" and
looked with fear on possible Japanese world economic 
12 2domination. This report reflected a basic concern over
possible Japanese acquisition and denial of critical 
advanced technologies, and their denial to the United
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States. Politicians view proposed acquisitions of
American high technology firms by the Japanese as a threat
12 3to American national interests. Politicians even blame
the Japanese government for the capital shortage along
w.ith the inability to wage war without Japanese financial
124backing.
Conflicting" national trade interests in the high
technology arena are a major source of clashes as the
United States struggles to maintain domestic and foreign
market shares. For example, the recent semi-conductor
pact between the United States' and Japanese governments
agrees in principle that American businesses receive
access to twenty percent of the Japanese market. It does
not guarantee achievement of this quota— despite the
American government's agreement to dissolve its
12 5anti-dumping price and-cost monitor system.
In addition to these conflicting interests, another
problem contributing to the current tensions is the
continued import imbalance. While the American monthly
trade deficit "was only US$4.05 billion [for] March 1991
. . . and just 0.9 percent of the GNP", the April 1991
figures reflected a 5.9 percent growth in imports to raise
12 6the deficit another US$4.78 billion. Exports increased
up 4.5 percent for a total of US$35.56 billion for the 
127same periods. This deficit means the United States'
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government must borrow more capital, something 
increasingly difficult to do. Less capital means tougher 
times for businesses. This is because businesses must 
compete with the federal government for funds. One 
example of this problem is the jump in government 
borrowing from US$247 billion in fiscal 1990 to US$328 
billion at the end of the fiscal year, and a decline in 
private loans from US$541 billion to US$232,128 What this 
means is slow private sector growth and lower 
productivity.
While not a major problem, the impact of the Japanese
stock market on the American economy is also a factor in
current economic tensions. With the impact of the June
1991 Recruit Corporation stock scandal in Japan on stock
share prices, a minor run on the American stock market
129occurred sending prices plummeting. Jitters m  the
American market indicate its close ties to the Japanese 
market. For example, Japanese direct investment in the 
United States totaled US$16,124 billion in 1983.130 If 
Japanese banks withdrew investments in the United States 
to shore up'Japanese industry, it could be disastrous for 
American manufacturing, industry, and services sectors.
Through the use of Modelski's phases of hegemony , 
delegitimation, and decline, one possible explanation of 
the Japanese-American relationship in the post World War
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II to the early 1980's . One key point was that the 
United States' government is no longer an unchallenged 
hegemonic power in the Pacific. One possibility was that 
the Japanese government may assume predominance in the 
relationship. Another possibility was that the United 
States' government may regain its supremacy. The extent 
to which economic positions shaped Japanese and American 
popular opinion augmented the perception of change in the 
relationship.
N
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter, one finds a summary of the preceding 
chapters and of their main points. The main argument made 
is that the United States' position as leader is ending 
and that a new long cycle is shaping up. It is possible 
Pacific trade may shape the next conflict and determine 
which nation will assume leadership Some corrective 
actions are offered with the hope they will be used to 
start another American long cycle. It is also possible 
that changes in this final stage of deconcentration may 
bring about a new regional system indep'endent of long 
cycle theory.
Briefly, this thesis concerned change, friction, and 
instability in United States-Japan bilateral relations.
The apparent decline of and challenge to the American 
government's regional leadership by the Japanese 
government led to the use of long cycle analysis to 
explain this phenomena. Chapter One presented a review of 
relevant international relations and foreign policy 
literature. An explanation of George Modelski's long 
cycle theory included the rationale for the choice and a
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summary of the theory. The premise of the chapter was 
that parallels in the United States-Japan relationship to 
global long cycle relationships allow one to use a 
modified version of long cycle analysis to explore the 
relationship.
In Chapter Two, one examined of the fourth stage of 
the first bilateral long cycle. A review of the 
Washington and London Naval Conferences emphasized the 
effect of economic forces on policy choices and the United 
States-Japan governmental relationship. Chapter Three 
covered the second and third stages of the current long 
cycle. The key points in Chapter Three were: (1). the
United States' government was the hegemonic leader of the 
Pacific after World War II until the late 1960s, (2) the
stability provided by American military' and economic 
assistance allowed Japanese business to flourish and met 
security needs, (3) in the late 1960s to early 1980s the 
American government's concept of regional security began 
to fall short of regional needs and the Japanese 
government and business community began to act 
independently, (4) the growing inability of the United 
States' government to supply capital required to support 
Japanese and regional growth and development forced the 
Japanese government and business community to fill 
leadership gaps in the Pacific, (5) the nature of
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leadership in the region no longer rests on naval and
economic power, but on trade, investment, capital, and
technology, (6) the Japanese government challenged the
United States' government for the role of regional leader
and may assume predominance in the relationship because of
its economic power, and (7) economic elements which
destabilized the United States-Japan relationship in stage
four of the previous bilateral long cycle are very similar
to those which exist in the current fourth stage.
While the Japanese government may replace the United
States' government as the regional leader, there is the
possibility that a new American cycle may occur if
American industry and government alter their practices.
Modelski's model allows this possibility. The resurgence
of Great Britain in the nineteenth century age of
industrialization is an example of resurgence. As part of \
a possible shift in economic matters, United States'
industry is changing.
For example, Illinois Tool Works (ITW), a precision
engineering firm, shifted to a "clearly defined corporate
strategy [of] . . . innovation and decentralized factories
131that customize products on demand" m  1989. This
enabled it to go from an uncompetitive stance to a "record
profit of US$182 million last year" in just one year's 
132time. On a larger scale, Motorola learned to compete
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in Japan. "By plowing massive funds into research and
development and capital investments" to the tune of over
20 percent of its 1991 revenues, Motorola improved its 
13 3product. Motorola's efforts at product improvement
worked well. Motorola's microchips are now in everything
from "Canon cameras to Sony camcorders. . . [and its voice
coder is] . . . the standard for Japan's . . . digital
telephone service." 134 While ITW and Motorola
implemented changes, they are not representative of a
possible American success at redress of the United States'
declining status in Pacific trade and power relations.
Despite American business turning to Japanese business for
management, marketing, and production techniques, the
13 5situation is uncertain.
Because their markets are mutually’ dependent, 
continued weakness in the American economy may affect the 
Japanese economy and Pacific economic stability. Because 
of their interdependence, the Japanese and American 
governments must cooperate on trade to ensure regional 
stability. The United States must reform its banking 
system, business practices, and trade policies to remain 
competitive and to maintain its standard of living. If it 
does no, it may become like Great Britain. Because of 
repeated currency devaluations between 1960 and 1988,
Great Britain fell from the richest to the poorest major
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nation in Europe, despite lowering its deficit to 0.3
percent of its GNP.136
If the American and Japanese economies are
interdependent and if the American economy drags down the
Japanese economy, the effect could spill over and upset
Pacific trade and stability. If one looks deeper than
Japan's soaring 11.2 percent economic growth rate, there
137are some soft spots. Japanese businesses do not
produce goods in large quantities, but work out of
existing inventories. One reason for this is a decreased
amount of exports to the United States due to American
economic problems. Japanese investment also shifted.
Over the past decade, Japanese industry invested
plant and capital in Southeast Asia as well as China. In
Thailand, for example, Japanese busines's investment
amounted to US$1.52 billion for 1985 to 1988, surpassing
138its investment in the United States! In 1989, Japanese
business invested US$270 billion in Asia versus US$206
13 9billion m  North America. The weakness of the American
dollar and the sluggish American economy forced Japanese 
industry to‘develop and expand markets in the Pacific.
Aside from these effects , less obvious ones are 
present. The most alarming effect is the resurgence of 
anti-American sentiment among the Japanese right-wing.
This harkens back to the militarism of the interwar
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period. If Shintaro Ishihara's The Japan That Can Sav No
is truly representative, then Japan may become a political
and strategic risk to American security interests in the
Pacific just as it was in the interwar period. Ishihara
argues for an independent Japanese economic and foreign
policy. The Japanese government is urged to stand up to
the United States' government and to act in its own best
interests, regardless of what the American government
wants it to do. Ishihara also touts Japan as the new
world economic leader with a right to demand the Americans
take notice of its wishes. This overtly militant stance
is yet one more indication of the change occurring in the
Japanese-American relationship and of the belief in Japan
that the United States is a declining power. It also
indicates that popular opinion in Japan' paints Japan as
14 0the United States' successor in the Pacific.
Whether the Japanese government becomes the new 
leader or the United States' government regains its 
hegemonic position, Pacific rim trade may determine the 
outcome. Based on changes in the Japanese-American 
relationship, it is possible trade replaced naval power as
the key agent of leadership in the fourth stage of the
current cycle. If this is true, whoever holds sway over 
Pacific trade may be the next leader. In the current
cycle's stage of deconcentration, Pacific trade may become
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the source of challenge necessary to end American
leadership and to precipitate the next leadership
conflict. An examination of trade and investment patterns
points to the importance of the Pacific trade as the new
measure for determining regional leadership.
In 1987, Japan exported US$154.1 trillion of finished
goods to the Pacific region and imported just over half
that figure from its Pacific neighbors.141 By 1989,
almost thirty percent of all Japanese exports went to
142Pacific nations. For example, iron and steel went to
Korea, tape recorders and ships to Singapore, power plants
to Thailand and Taiwan and metal processing machinery to
14 3Thailand and Korea.
Coinciding with increased level of exports to Pacific
nations, the Japanese government exported capital through
direct investment. In the Pacific as a whole, the
Japanese government increased its 1988 investment by 14.4
percent over what it spent in 1987 for a total value of
US$5,569 billion.144 By far the greatest share of
investment capital went to Thailand. Japanese business
investment in Thailand soared 243.6 percent over its 1937
level, while Hong Kong and Singapore saw 55 and 51.2
14 5percent increases for the same period respectively.
This kind of investment indicates an immense interest in 
the Pacific market and points to the possibility of the
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Japanese government and industry staking a claim to 
leadership.
As a result of this tremendous influx of capital into
the Pacific, Japanese industrial development became
ubiquitous. This capital boom helped lift standards of
living, create jobs, and turn nations such as Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia into
14 6export-oriented manufacturing nations. The economic
growth generated in the region in 1990 by Yen-diplomacy
surpassed that of North America for the first time in
147history.
Along with the spread of industrial growth, Japanese
economic might also increased in the region. For example,
Japanese direct investment accounted for US$35.95 billion
invested in the Pacific in 1983 versus US$20.67 billion by
14 8the United States. These two are closely linked as a
vibrant manufacturing sector denotes an expanding economy 
and further strengthen^ it. Where American industry 
dominated Pacific development in stage two, it is the role 
of Japanese finance agencies in stage four. Japanese 
busine'ss is the new leading economic power in the Pacific 
and may tilt the balance of power sharply toward the 
Japanese government.
For the past fourteen years, the Japanese government 
consistently spent more than the United States' government
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and business community in terms of total investment and
shows no signs of weakening its commitment to the 
149region. In the last two years alone, the Japanese
government spent US$17.6 billion in the Pacific compared
w-ith the United States' government's paltry US$4.6 
150billion. With no real military threat and the limited
withdrawal of American forces from the region, the United
States' government's economic weakness is most apparent.
In 1990, the United States' standard of living fell.
The top six industrialized nations closed the gap
separating them from what was once the world's highest
151standard of living. The American economy grew slowly
since 1972, while the Japanese standard of living grew 80
152percent during the same period. Measured m  terms of
gross domestic product (GDP), the average American GDP
fell to US$14,070 per capita from US$14,080 in 1989 and s
capital investment formed only 12.6% of American GDP
153 .versus 23.4% of Japanese GDP. While the cost of living
is higher in Japan, the Japanese standard of living
improved in 1989, while the United States' standard of
living fell.
Because the levels for GDP and the creation of new 
businesses are both low, exports are a potential source of 
continued growth. This situation is reminiscent of both 
the Japanese government's and the United States'
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154government's positions in the 1930s. For this formula
to work, orders for durable goods must increase. However, 
orders for durable goods dropped 1.6 percent in June 1991 
to US$116.52 billion as orders to defense contractors fell
I R C
US$1.5 billion. Unlike the 1960s to 1970s where
exports increased eight percent a year, export growth fell
156to only five percent a year after 1980. In short, the
United States' government's gross national product (GNP) 
is stagnant.
Since the GDP is based in part on export sales, any
decrease in exports adversely affects it. When the GDP
falls, poverty rates go up. Corresponding to the 0.5
percent decline in the GDP, the number of poor in America
increased roughly six percent to just over two million 
157people m  1991. Additionally, the jobless rate rose
158from 433,000 to 439,000 for the same period. One must
bear in mind the basis for statistics are unemployment 
applications. There is no allowance for those people who 
either did not file for unemployment or who are working 
part-time or on temporary jobs until a full-time job 
becomes available. Therefore, the actual numbers may be 
greater than reported.
While American exports affect the United States' 
economy directly, foreign exports have an indirect impact 
on it too. By supplying investment capital in the
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Pacific, the Japanese government virtually ensured a cycle
of increased Pacific exports to America. These exports
are necessary to fuel the import of industrial supplies
and equipment from the Japanese government to its client 
159states. In essence, the Japanese government's efforts
to expand trade in the Pacific and to diversify clientele 
resulted in a virtual closing of Pacific markets to 
American products by tying regional growth and well-being 
to the availability of Japanese capital and investment.
Although exports are critically important to the 
economic well-being of'a country, competitiveness is just 
as crucial. To define competitiveness, the "1990 World 
Competitiveness Report" focused on factors which make a 
country attractive to investors and which highlight the 
aggressiveness exhibited by its corporations 
world-wide.160 The factors highlighted in the report are 
"domestic economic strength, [the degree of] 
internationalization, [the stability and the kind of] 
government, [available] finances, [the level of] 
infrastructure, [the type of] management [techniques 
utilized], [the ability to exploit] science and 
technology, and [the nature and caliber of its] 
people".161 These determinants are then applied to 
industrialized and newly industrialized economies.
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When applied to the Japanese government, the report 
found it to be the best in all but two areas. The large 
degree of industrialization, superior business management, 
a strong economy and first-rate use of science and 
technology indicate the Japanese government's predominance 
in Pacific competition.162 While the United States' 
government is the best for infrastructure (natural 
resources, transportation, communications) and second to 
the Japanese government in the quality of its labor force 
and use of science and technology, it lacks business 
confidence and is held back by its enormous budget and 
trade deficits.163 Based on this report, the United 
States' government has a precarious position as second 
best to the Japanese government.
Underscoring this alarming proposition, is Japan's
US$32 billion surplus and the United States' government's
US$110 billion deficit.164 The United States' government
is the world's largest debtor (US$660 billion). It no
longer leads in production of goods and services or
standard of living, and it has a virtually imperceptible
165one percent yearly growth rate. Japan has a higher
growth rate than the United States. Japan also has the 
world's highest standard of living. Japan is the world's 
industrial and financial leader, the position the United 
States' government assumed from Great Britain in 1930.
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Another key factor ensuring continued Japanese growth and 
economic strength is the investment in and utilization of 
research and development.166
While the United States' government is in trouble 
economically and its market share and influence in the 
Pacific face erosion, it is possible it can begin a second 
period of Pacific leadership. This is compatible with 
long cycle theory as a power can reemerge after 
experiencing a stage of challenge and decline. In the 
American case, this depends on its ability to preclude 
further market losses in the Pacific. For this to occur, 
the United States' government must define and focus its 
business and economic interests and adapt its products to 
meet local market needs. American businesses must be 
competitive with Japanese businesses within the Pacific 
market.
To define and focus its economic interests, the 
United States' government must look to the long term. The 
United States' government invests less than one percent of
its GNP per year in infrastructure compared to the five
* 167percent rate of the Japanese government. Investment in
infrastructure creates roughly 41,000 new jobs for every
US$1 billion spent on development and maintenance of 
168infrastructure. In short, the American government must
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invest at home and abroad. It must correct the research
and development dilemma.
Where the Japanese government and industry fund
large-scale basic research and further industrial
exploitation and marketing of research findings, United
States' government and business do not. American firms
must follow the lead of the Pall Corporation and IBM. By
capitalizing on superior technology gained through
aggressive research, engineering, and specialization, Pall
outsells Asahi and Tenimo corporations' blood filter 
169products. IBM did the same thing: created
technologically superior personal computers and made
170in-roads m  the Japanese computer market.
For a third American cycle to occur, American 
business must adapt just as Japanese bu’siness did in 
stages two through four of the current long cycle. The 
Japanese auto industry came a long way by using 
adaptability to its advantage. For example, Honda turned 
to the American love and vision of the automobile to 
create a solid, marketable product. American 
manufacturers must do the same thing. Right-hand drive 
automobiles, smaller bodies for narrow Pacific roads, 
metric-convertible parts, etc. must be adopted. The 
product must fit the environment, not the other way 
around.
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Aside from adapting to meet market needs, American
companies must compete with Japanese industries at home
and in the Pacific. Currently, the United States fills as
almost colonial position of "exporting raw materials and
importing manufactured goods" to and from Japan and the
171Pacific respectively. If the United States is to
retain economic leadership, it must export more than 
unfinished goods. Looking back at American history, both 
Alexander Hamilton and nineteenth century American 
industrialists understood the importance of developing an 
industrial base if the country was to remain strong and 
independent. By switching from an agricultural to an 
industrial society, the United States' government became a 
rich, powerful, Pacific player in the late nineteenth and 
the twentieth centuries. If one applies this test to the 
newly industrialized nations of the Pacific, the same 
holds true with their relation to the Japanese government. 
The switch from agriculture to industry transformed these 
countries to prosperous, vibrant ones capable of taking on 
not only the United States but Japan as well.
Additionally, the United States' government and 
industry must invest in new plants, equipment, technology, 
and research. The key to this renaissance is the 
aggressive pursuit of quality, superior design, 
reliability, affordability, and sound marketing. This
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must be followed by investment of American capital in both 
the Pacific and in the United States. This follows 
Modelski's tenet that the nation which controls capital is 
the economic leader and it can control the actions of 
other states.
If trade friction or trade warfare is the conflict 
necessary to bring about the next long cycle, then Japan 
and the United States should continue to be fiercely 
competitive over trade in the current long cycle. If long 
cycle analysis continues to be applicable in the next 
century, then it is possible a trade conflict could occur 
in the form of regional trade warfare. If this conflict 
does occur, Japan may emerge as the next leader. If this 
is the case, the Japanese government may achieve regional 
control through its telecommunications technology 
(satellite and space surveillance) and its vast financial 
empire. The Japanese government will have to develop a 
regional view independent of its domestic interests if it 
is to assume the mantle of leadership in the next long 
cycle.
It is possible a "Pax Niponnica" will occur. The 
Japanese government will assume the role of global 
economic leader. This will be brought about by the 
superpowers bankrupting themselves in an arms race. Once 
this occurs, Japanese industry and trade will shape how
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the world develops as the strength of Japan in those areas
will allow it to dictate non-military solutions to world 
172problems. Japan has the same characteristics which
allowed the United States to dominate the twentieth
century: (1) a large export surplus, (2) vast amounts of
capital, (3) industrial leadership, (4) technological
173supremacy, and (5) military strength.
Additionally, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone even 
admitted "the Pacific is an inevitability" and Japanese
newspaper editorials discussed internationalizing as early
174as 1987. Even a Nomura report compared the United
States-Japanese relationship to the United States-Great
Britain relationship of the early twentieth century, with
Japan emerging as the global intellectual and moral 
175leader.
Given the nature of Japan's Pacific trade and the \
evidence of prolonged decline and continued economic 
malaise, the United States' government is no longer the 
first rate power in the Pacific. By failing to invest 
time and capital in the Pacific to ensure its market 
access, the United States' government faces a challenge 
for the role of leader. The Japanese government is 
filling the void created by the United States' 
government's economic decline in the Pacific. Of course, 
if the nature of change digresses from Modelski's
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model, another leader will emerge and a new model have to 
be developed.
Based on economic factors, it is possible the 
Japanese government may assume leadership in a new long 
cycle. The Pacific may be the next arena of hegemonic 
conflict. The winner of this possible conflict may assume 
the role of Pacific leader. Investment, trade, 
technology, and spending patterns shore up this point.
While it is also possible that the United States 
could halt its decline and reemerge as the next leader in 
the coming long cycle, evidence seems to indicate this 
will not happen. Finally, it is also possible that the 
changes occurring at present may lead to the replacement 
of the existing pattern of long cycles with a new pattern 
of relationships.
89
GLOSSARY
balance of trade— the value of imports and exports which 
exists between two or more countries; when trade is 
balanced it is in equilibrium; when trade is unbalanced a 
surplus or a deficit will occur in the respective 
state(s).
deconcentration— the fourth stage of Modelski's theory 
of long cycles involving the breakdown of the 
hegemonic power and the challenge posed by other 
states for assumption of the leadership role still 
provided, although less and less efficiently, by the 
declining hegemonic power.
delegitimation— the third stage of Modelski's theory of 
long cycles involving the appearance of reemerging 
instability after a period of hegemonic peace and 
stability; occurs due to the hegemonic power's 
inability to meet world security and stability needs; 
invalidates previous formula for providing stability.
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global war— trade and/or military conflict between
states which affects the world's political, economic, 
and/or military security.
GNP— gross national product; the total value of the
goods and services produced by the residents of a 
state during a specific period of time, usually a 
year; used interchangeably with GDP (gross domestic 
product).
world power— a state which, by virtue of its economic, 
technological, and/or military power is able to 
influence the political actions and decisions of 
other states without actually using that power.
\
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